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Casenote
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King:
An Erroneous Application of
Personal Jurisdiction Law to
Internet-based Contacts
(Using the Reasonableness Test to Ensure
Fair Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction
Based on Cyberspace Contacts)
I. Introduction
WARNING: If you are reading this Note from an electronic
database, you are deemed to have consented to resolving all legal
disputes arising from the contents of this Note under New York
laws and within a New York state court. If you do not agree, do
NOT continue to read this Note.
This type of warning may be required to avoid becoming
subject to a foreign state's jurisdiction through one's Internet
activities. Failure to clearly post such a warning may mean
that one has consented to the distribution of one's web site
throughout the world-wide web and to any person accessing it.
Since the web site can be accessed virtually anywhere, the web
site creator may purposefully avail himself of the laws of every
state - maybe even every nation.
The question is whether an Internet web site, even a pas-
sive one, constitutes a constitutionally sufficient basis upon
which a court in a foreign forum may assert personal jurisdic-
tion.' Even though a finding of personal jurisdiction once re-
1. Also known as in personam jurisdiction.
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quired strict physical presence within a state's boundaries, 2 the
evolution of technology has mandated a change in that tradi-
tional rule. Since 1877, both statutory and common laws have
relaxed personal jurisdiction requirements by expanding the
definition of physical presence. 3 In 1945, the Supreme Court in
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington4 redefined the
"anachronistic"5 Pennoyer rule, enabling an assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction when "minimum contacts" are present within
the forum, to the extent that such minimum contacts would not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."6
Since International Shoe, courts have struggled to apply
the evolved personal jurisdiction test to varied situations.7
Principles and standards have emerged resulting in the devel-
opment of guideposts to assess personal jurisdiction.8 However,
there remains the need to respond to constant changes in the
ways in which businesses operate.9
As early as 1996, the limit of the minimum contacts analy-
sis was again tested' when courts questioned whether an In-
ternet1 presence constituted minimum contacts under the
2. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. See infra Parts II.A and II.B and accompanying text.
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 3.10, at 120 (2d ed. 1995).
6. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(citations omitted).
7. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984); infra Part II.B and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part II.B and accompanying text (discussing in detail the factors
courts have considered in deciding whether to assert personal jurisdiction).
9. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 5, § 3.10, at 120. Those authors suggest that
the case "adopted a new, more flexible standard for the assertion of personal juris-
diction, based upon a jurisdictional theory and standards better suited to a pro-
gressively more mobile society." Id. See, for example, Frummer v. Hilton Hotels
Int'l, 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1967), involving a tourist
who was injured at a Hilton Hotel in England. Hilton Hotels, an English corpora-
tion, established a reservation center in New York using a 1-800 telephone
number. See id. at 537. New York's highest court agreed that the reservation
center provided a minimum contact in light of the fact that the agency was doing
all the business the principle could be doing if it were actually in New York. See
id. at 538.
10. See Leif Swedlow, Three Paradigms of Presence: A Solution for Personal
Jurisdiction on the Internet, 22 OKLA. L. REV. 337 (1997).
11. For an in depth definition and explanation of the Internet and the modes
of connecting and transmitting information, see Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96
Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997). The Internet has been defined
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol19/iss1/7
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International Shoe standard. 12 Since that time, and through to-
day, courts continue to struggle with this question. 13 Given that
the Internet is accessible world-wide, the fear has been that if a
web site establishes minimum contacts, then the defendants
will be subject to personal jurisdiction in all jurisdictions. On
the other hand, denying that an Internet site is a method by
which people knowingly conduct activities in foreign states may
enable corporations to be "present" in a foreign state without
being subject to its jurisdiction. 14 Neither extreme seems desir-
able. The Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to respond,
although it has suggested in the past that it is reluctant to de-
velop firm standards in the ever-changing technological arena. 15
as follows: "The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant
network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer net-
works. It is thus a network of networks." Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (quot-
ing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). "Reasonable estimates
are that as many as 40 million people around the world can and do access the
Internet; that figure is expected to grow to 200 million Internet users by 1999."
Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (citing Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 871). "The Internet
is a decentralized, global medium of communications - or 'cyber space' - that links
people, institutions, corporations and governments around the world .... These
communications can occur almost instantaneously, and can be directed either to
specific individuals, to a broader group of people interested in a particular subject,
or to the world as a whole." Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 871. "The Internet is a coopera-
tive venture, owned by no one, but regulated by several volunteer agencies." Gold-
berger, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (quoting MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)); see also EDLAS Software Int'l v. BASIS Int'l, 947 F. Supp. 413,
419- 20 (D. Ariz. 1996); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill.
1996); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing Inc., 939 F. Supp.
1032-37, 1039-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Swedlow, supra note 10.
12. See International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Compare, e.g., John Matney et al., Brief for Respondent, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COM-
PUTER & INFo. L. 627 (1996) (based on a hypothetical factual situation, arguing
that Internet presence may confer personal jurisdiction), with Aaron Reber et al.,
Brief for Petitioner, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 595 (1996) (based on a
hypothetical factual situation, arguing that Internet presence does not confer per-
sonal jurisdiction).
13. It has been recognized that the Internet maintains no definable territorial
boundaries. See Digital Equipment Corp. v. Altavista Technology, 960 F. Supp.
456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997). In that case, District Judge Gertner suggested that "[tlo
paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the Internet is concerned, not only is there
perhaps 'no there there,' the 'there' is everywhere where there is Internet access."
Digital Equipment, 960 F. Supp. at 462 (no citation provided).
14. See infra Part II.B and accompanying text.
15. See Denver Area Education Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
518 U.S. 727 (1996) (plurality decision finding it unwise to establish guidelines
now, considering the changes in law and technology).
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Nevertheless, the issue is ripe for resolution in light of the
growing number of organizations and people transacting busi-
ness over the Internet. 16
Part II of this Note will discuss both the statutory and com-
mon law aspects and requirements of personal jurisdiction.
Also, it will elucidate many recent decisions which have consid-
ered whether use of the Internet constitutes a valid contact for
personal jurisdiction. New York has forayed into the personal
jurisdiction question in light of Internet presence. 17 In Ben-
susan Restaurant Corporation v. King, the court dismissed a
complaint against a Missouri resident for lack of personal juris-
diction, holding that an Internet web page was not a sufficient
contact.' 8 Part III will discuss the Bensusan case in depth.
Part IV is an analysis of the Bensusan decision which argues
that the court erred in holding that Internet presence is a con-
stitutionally insufficient contact. In addition, Part IV will sug-
gest a new way in which current personal jurisdiction law may
be applied to limit the possibility of world-wide jurisdiction, and
at the same time prevent parties from using the Internet as a
jurisdictional shield.
II. The Law of Personal Jurisdiction
A. Long-Arm Statutes
Long-arm statutes, otherwise known as single-act statutes,
outline the circumstances under which a state can exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 19 Once statu-
tory compliance has been met, a court must turn to the
constitutional parameters of personal jurisdiction as estab-
16. See David Thatch, Personal Jurisdiction and the World-Wide Web: Bits
(And Bytes) of Minimum Contacts, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 143, 153
(1997) (discussing new uses of the Internet) (citing Surfs Up for New-Wave Bank-
ers, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 1995, at 77; Vic Sussman and Kenan Pollack, Gold
Rush in Cyberspace, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 13, 1995, at 73; Will Your
Next Computer Be a Tin Can and a Wire?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 1995, at 75).
See also Swedlow, supra note 10.
17. See, e.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
18. See id. at 295-96.
19. See Friedenthal, supra note 5, § 3.12, at 139; see also Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (1927).
152 [Vol. 19:149
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lished under common law.20 Not all states have chosen to allow
their courts to find personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed
by the Constitution.21 For example, New York's long-arm stat-
ute restricts the exercise of personal jurisdiction to instances
where specified transactions have taken place. 22 In contrast,
California's statute has a scope as broad as the Constitution
permits, providing that "[a] court of this state may exercise ju-
risdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of
this state or of the United States."23
Since each state may design its own long-arm statute, this
Note does not attempt to assess the impact of such statutes on
cases dealing with Internet presence. Instead, this Note con-
centrates on the next hurdle: the constitutional considerations.
20. See infra Part II.B and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 23.
22. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 1997) which authorizes personal ju-
risdiction when a nonresident person or corporation:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply
goods or services in the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or prop-
erty within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of
character arising from the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in
the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or interna-
tional commerce; or
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 1997).
23. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1997). Rhode Island enacted a simi-
larly broad long-arm statute, providing that:
Every [non-resident] . . . that shall have the necessary minimum contacts
with the state of Rhode Island, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the
state of Rhode Island, and the courts of this state shall hold such [non-resi-
dents] ... amenable to suit in Rhode Island in every case not contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-5-33(a) (1997).
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B. Retrospective: The Evolution of the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction
In Pennoyer v. Neff,24 the Supreme Court established that
"[tihe authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the
territorial limits of the State in which it is established.."25 The
Court reasoned that a state could maintain jurisdiction of per-
sons and property found only within its territorial boundaries. 26
This reasoning stemmed from the notion that each state is like
an independent nation and so cannot intrude on the sovereignty
of neighboring "nations."27 Over 100 years later, the physical
presence test remains, in varying form, as one test for personal
jurisdiction. 28 Today, of course, physical presence is one way a
court may retain general jurisdiction over a defendant. 29
In 1945, however, the Supreme Court restated its position
on personal jurisdiction requirements, shifting the focus away
from actual physical presence as a prerequisite. 30 In Interna-
tional Shoe, the Court considered whether a Delaware corpora-
tion could be "present" in the state of Washington by means of
its contacts with that state.31 The appellant shoe company did
not have an office, make contracts for sale or purchase, or main-
tain any stock in the forum state.32 However, eleven to thirteen
salespeople resided in Washington at various times and their
main activities were confined to that state.33 Each sale regis-
tered within Washington was subject to approval by the home
office in Missouri.34
Even though International Shoe was not actually physi-
cally present in the forum state, the Court permitted an asser-
24. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
25. Id. at 720.
26. See id. at 723-24.
27. See Friedenthal, supra note 5, § 3.3, at 97.
28. Some may suggest that the traditional Pennoyer physical presence test
was dispensed with in the Court's decision in International Shoe. See
Friendenthal, supra note 5, § 3.10, at 121.
29. See infra note 82 and accompanying text (indicating the ways in which a
court may retain general jurisdiction over a defendant).
30. See International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
31. See id. at 311.
32. See id. at 313.
33. See id. at 313-14.
34. See id. at 314.
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tion of personal jurisdiction. 35 In doing so, the Court
established a new test of personal jurisdiction: the minimum
contacts and reasonableness test.36 The Court reasoned that
since a corporation is a fiction, presence should be determined
considering due process requirements.37 The Court concluded
that the relevant due process considerations include an "esti-
mate of the inconveniences" which the defendant would face as
a result of a trial away from its home state.38 The Court broke
new ground when it ruled that:
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."39
Since International Shoe, the Court has attempted to ex-
plain the limitations of the minimum contacts doctrine, and
provide a clearer understanding of "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."40 In World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson,41 for example, the Court drew a clearer dis-
tinction between the concepts of "minimum contacts" and
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" (the test
for reasonableness).42 In that case, the Court considered
whether an Oklahoma court could assert personal jurisdiction
over a New York corporation as a result of an automobile acci-
dent in Oklahoma. 43 Harry and Kay Robinson, on their way
from New York to their new home in Arizona, were involved in
a serious accident with their new Audi, purchased from one of
the defendants in New York." The Robinsons brought suit al-
35. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 317; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV.
38. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gil-
bert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)); see also Friedenthal, supra note 5, § 3.10, at
122.
39. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457
(1940)).
40. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 5, § 3.10, at 121.
41. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
42. See id. at 291-92; see also FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 5, § 3.10, at 122.
43. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 287-89.
44. See id.
155
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leging faulty design because the gas tank exploded in the
collision.45
Holding that the defendant car dealership was not "pres-
ent" in Oklahoma, the World-Wide Volkswagen Court elabo-
rated on the traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice test, suggesting that the defendant's ties to the forum
state must be such that it would be "reasonable" to hale the de-
fendant into court there. 46 The Court defined "reasonable" as a
multi-part consideration of: the "burden on the defendant"47 in
light of the "forum State's interest in adjudicating the dis-
pute;"48 the "plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and ef-
fective relief;"49 the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining an efficient resolution;50 and the "shared interests of
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies."51 The Court intimated, however, that the reasonable-
ness test remains as a secondary consideration to the minimum
contacts analysis.52
In light of the fact that technological developments have
"accelerated" the ways in which people conduct business, the
Court observed that the concept of minimum contacts had
progressed since International Shoe.53 However, the Court also
remarked that it would be a "mistake to assume that this trend
heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal
45. See id.
46. Id. at 292 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 292.
48. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (citing McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
49. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (citing Kulko v. California Supe-
rior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)).
50. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
51. Id.
52. See id. The Court indicated that even if the minimum contacts analysis
was satisfied, "the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate feder-
alism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judg-
ment." Id. at 294.
53. See id. at 293-95. "As technological progress has increased the flow of
commerce between the States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has un-
dergone similar increase. At the same time, progress in communications and
transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burden-
some." See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958)).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol19/iss1/7
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jurisdiction of state courts."54 The Court concluded that
Oklahoma could not retain personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant since the only contact in the forum state was through a
unilateral act by the plaintiff.55 Even though it may have been
foreseeable to defendants that an automobile would be used for
long distance travel, "'foreseeability' alone has never been a suf-
ficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Pro-
cess Clause. ' 56 Moreover, the Court did not accept the
plaintiffs argument that the defendant should have foreseen
the Audi being driven into a foreign state.57 Instead of mere
foreseeability, the Court insisted that the standard is one which
requires that the defendant's conduct be directed at the forum
state, and that he purposefully avail himself of the advantages
of the laws of that state.58 If the requisite purposeful availment
exists, then foreseeability would be said to exist and the mini-
mum contacts test satisfied. 59 This standard would provide the
defendant with "clear notice" that he may be subject to suit in
the forum state.60
Evidence of purposeful availment may exist if the defend-
ant, through his channels of distribution, "delivers [his] prod-
ucts into the stream of commerce" 61 of the forum state.
Therefore, introduction of one's goods into the stream of com-
merce provides the necessary foreseeability under the Due Pro-
cess Clause.
In a later case, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,62 the Court
again drew a distinction between the minimum contacts analy-
sis and the fair play and substantial justice test.63 There, the
Court decided that a Florida court could retain personal juris-
diction over a Michigan company.64 The defendant was a Michi-
54. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at
250-51).
55. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
56. See id. at 295. The Court disagreed that a seller's chattel could automati-
cally be appointed as agent for service of process. See id.
57. See id. at 296 n.11 (citations omitted).
58. See id. at 297.
59. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 298.
62. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
63. See id. at 476.
64. See id. at 478.
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gan businessperson who entered into a franchise agreement
with the plaintiff, Burger King, headquartered in Miami, Flor-
ida.65 Franchise payments were made to the Florida office and
when the defendant allegedly breached the agreement, corre-
spondence from Burger King originated from its Florida head-
quarters. 66 The Court reaffirmed the "stream of commerce" test
when it noted that a defendant is warned of a suit in a forum
state when it has "purposefully directed" activities at residents
of the forum state. 67 This holding prevents the use of the Due
Process Clause as a "territorial shield" to avoid voluntarily as-
sumed responsibilities. 68
The Court further noted that once a court has determined
that the requisite minimum contacts exist, personal jurisdiction
is presumptively reasonable. 69 If notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice cut against a finding of personal jurisdiction,
this presumption may be defeated.70 In balancing between
these semi-independent tests, the Burger King Court suggested
that a non-resident defendant should be able to "reasonably an-
ticipate being haled into court" in the foreign jurisdiction.71
Where a defendant has purposefully "directed his activities at
forum residents [and] seeks to defeat jurisdiction,"72 the burden
shifts to the defendant to "present a compelling case that the
presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable."73 Conversely, the reasonableness test may bol-
65. See id. at 464-67.
66. See id. at 468.
67. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). The Court suggested that the purposeful availment con-
sideration "ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a
result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts." Burger King, 471 U.S. at
475 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980)).
68. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474.
69. See id. at 476; see also Friedenthal, supra note 5, § 3.13, at 146.
70. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78; see also Friedenthal, supra note 5,
§ 3.13, at 146.
71. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. "The focus of the inquiry is on the rela-
tionship 'among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."' Smith v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356, 1360 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977)).
72. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
73. Id. "Once the defendant properly disputes the existence of personal juris-
diction, the plaintiff bears the burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, sufficient facts demonstrating the court's jurisdiction." Weber v. Jolly
158 [Vol. 19:149
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ster a less than adequate finding of minimum contacts such
that the test "sometimes serve[s] to establish jurisdiction upon
a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be
required."74 Therefore, a plaintiff may be able to persuade a
court to exercise personal jurisdiction despite weaker evidence
of minimum contacts, with greater showings of additional fac-
tors going to fair play and substantial justice requirements.7 5
In other cases, the Court continued to contribute to the un-
derstanding of the due process requirements for personal juris-
diction. 76 For instance, as long as a "substantial connection"
with the forum state is established, one act within the forum
state may support a finding of personal jurisdiction.77 However,
if the contacts with the forum are sporadic or limited, jurisdic-
tion may only be predicated upon acts arising out of the
contact(s). 78
From these and other refinements, four "guideposts"79 have
emerged to determine the appropriateness of personal jurisdic-
tion in light of the test for minimum contacts.80 The first guide-
post is when "[a] defendant's activity in the forum is continuous
and systematic 81 general jurisdiction may be asserted.8 2 Since
a defendant's presence in the forum state is ongoing, the asser-
tion of jurisdiction neither offends the due process requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice, regardless of whether the cause of
action arises out of the contacts.8 3 In the second situation,
when a defendant engages in systematic and continuous activi-
Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 331 (D. N.J. 1997) (citing Carteret Savings Bank FA v.
Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 817 (1992)).
74. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 780 (1984); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24
(1957)).
75. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
76. See, e.g., infra note 88.
77. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
78. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
79. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 5, § 3.10, at 121.
80. See id. (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 122.
82. "A court of 'general jurisdiction' is one which takes cognizance of all cases.
.. " BLAciKs LAW DICTIONARY 471 (abridged 6 th ed. 1991). See FRIEDENTHAL, supra
note 5, § 3.10, at 123-24.
83. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
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ties in the forum state, but the cause of action does not arise out
of them, the question of personal jurisdiction is left open to state
laws.8 4 Third, when the cause of action arises out of a defend-
ant's single or isolated contact with the state, the defendant
may be subject to the forum's jurisdiction since the defendant
will have created a substantial enough connection with the fo-
rum state.8 5 In this case, specific jurisdiction may be found.8 6
Lastly, when a defendant's activities in the forum state are spo-
radic and irregular, and the action complained of does not arise
out of those minimal contacts, personal jurisdiction will not be
found .87
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,88 the per-
sonal jurisdiction issue was revisited by the Court when it con-
sidered whether a California court could assert personal
jurisdiction over a Japanese corporation.8 9 While driving his
motorcycle, Gary Zurcher lost control and crashed into a trac-
tor.90 Zurcher claimed that the crash was caused by an ex-
ploded faulty tire valve.91 Cheng Shin, a named defendant, was
the Taiwanese manufacturer of that tire's tube.92 Asahi was
Cheng Shin's Japanese supplier. 93 Cheng Shin sued Asahi in
84. See Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
85. See Friedenthal, supra note 5, § 3.10, at 123; see also McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (only contact with forum state was
insurance policy issued to resident plaintiff). See generally Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citation omitted).
86. "'Specific' jurisdiction contrasts with 'general' jurisdiction," in that under
the latter, "a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not
arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum." Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, n.9 (1984). See
Friedenthal, supra note 5, § 3.10, at 123. "The terms 'general' and 'special,' ap-
plied to jurisdiction, indicate the difference between a legal authority extending to
the whole of a particular subject and one limited to a part; and, when applied to
the terms of court, the occasion upon which these powers can be respectively exer-
cised." BLAcK's LAw DICTIoNARY 471 (abridged 6 th ed. 1991).
87. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ("The cause of action in this
case is not one that arises out of an act done or transaction consummated in the
forum State .... Consequently, this suit cannot be said to be one to enforce an
obligation that arose from a privilege the defendant exercised in Florida."). Id. at
251; see also Friedenthal, supra note 5, § 3.10, at 123.
88. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
89. See id.
90. See id. at 105.
91. See id. at 106.
92. See id.
93. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106.
160
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California for indemnification. 94 After Zurcher's claim was set-
tled and dismissed against Cheng Shin and the other defend-
ants, Cheng Shin's indemnification action against Asahi was
the only remaining claim.95
On the issue of reasonableness, the Asahi Court unani-
mously concluded that personal jurisdiction was unreasonable
and that a contrary conclusion "would offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."96 The Court stated that
California had no manifest interest in providing a forum for an
indemnification suit for a Taiwanese corporation, especially be-
cause the plaintiff had another forum in which to litigate.97
Moreover, the Court recognized that traveling to California to
defend the suit was an extreme burden on the defendant. 98
On the issue of minimum contacts, however, the Court's de-
cision was a plurality. 99 Three distinct opinions were rendered
by the Court, two of which are discussed here. 100 By interpret-
ing and applying World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice O'Connor,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell, and Justice
Scalia, found that the mere "placement of a product into the
stream of commerce" will not support a finding of minimum con-
tacts. 101 Justice O'Connor wrote that the foreseeability require-
ment outlined in World-Wide Volkswagen 0 2 may be satisfied
when there is evidence of a defendant's intent to direct his ac-
tivities to the forum state. 0 3 She further stated that a defend-
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 105.
97. See id. at 114 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at
316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
98. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
99. See id. at 102-05.
100. The third opinion, authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices
White and Blackmun, argued that the Court need not always look at the minimum
contacts criteria in determining the constitutionality of a state's assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction. See id. at 121. Instead, Stevens suggested that traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice may serve to defeat any assertion of
personal jurisdiction and thus concluded the inquiry. See id. However, if the
Court had considered minimum contacts, Stevens would have found the issues of
"volume, [ I value, and [the] hazardous character" of the products to be controlling.
Id.
101. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112; see also FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 5, § 3.11, at
137.
102. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
103. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
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ant's intent may be shown by "designing the product for the
market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, es-
tablishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in
the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor
who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum
State."10 4 However, "a defendant's awareness that the stream
of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State
does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the
stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum
State."0 5
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, applied the stream of commerce theory established
in World-Wide Volkswagen differently. 0 6 Under their interpre-
tation, foreseeability and intent are established through the
placement of products into the stream of commerce. 10 7 Brennan
reasoned that "[tihe stream of commerce refers not to unpredict-
able currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow
of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale."0 8
Knowledge of the stream of commerce, therefore, provides ade-
quate notice to a defendant that he may be haled into a foreign
forum to settle disputes.10 9
C. Prospective: Internet Contacts and the Question of
Personal Jurisdiction
In addition to the Bensusan decision discussed below, 10
many other courts throughout this country have considered
whether an Internet web site or transmissions through the In-
ternet render a defendant constitutionally present in a foreign
jurisdiction."' While the answers have not been consistent,
three generalizations may be made in order to better compre-
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 116; see also Friedenthal, supra note 5, § 3.11, at 137.
107. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 117. Justice Brennan also concluded that his interpretation of
"stream of commerce" had been adopted by "most courts and commentators." Id.
(citations omitted).
109. See id.
110. See infra Part III.
111. Lawyers in other countries have also begun to consider this issue. See
Monique Conrod, Website Advertising Raises Troubling Jurisdictional Issues, THE
LAwYERs WEEKLY (CANADA), October 31, 1997, at 15.
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hend some emerging trends: (1) because the potential is world-
wide jurisdiction, a web site, especially a passive one,112 should
not be an adequate premise on which to find minimum contacts
in a foreign forum;113 (2) while the potential may be world-wide
jurisdiction, it is sometimes the case that a defendant expected
or desired his web site to be accessed in a foreign forum or to be
used on the Internet to his benefit, and so a finding of minimum
contacts is not de facto unconstitutional; 114 and, (3) although
there is the potential for world-wide jurisdiction, a defendant
who establishes a web site has knowledge of the nature of the
Internet and thus cannot claim to be surprised that he must
answer a claim in a foreign forum. 1 5 The basis for drawing
these generalizations is elucidated below, using case examples.
1. Because the potential is world-wide jurisdiction, a web
site, especially a passive one, should not be an
adequate premise on which to find minimum
contacts in a foreign forum
In Hearst Corporation v. Goldberger,"6 an Internet web site
was rejected as a basis for finding personal jurisdiction in New
York against a New Jersey domiciliary." 7 Hearst, the publisher
of Esquire Magazine, filed suit alleging that Goldberger's re-
quest to register and his subsequent registration of the domain
name "ESQWIRE.COM" constituted trademark infringe-
ment. 18 At the time the suit was filed, the web site was under
112. A passive web site is one that does little more than make information
available, as opposed to an interactive web site, which provides for the exchange of
information. See Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
113. See infra Part II.B.1 and accompanying text.
114. See infra Part II.B.2 and accompanying text.
115. See infra Part II.B.3 and accompanying text.
116. No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
117. See id. at *1.
118. See id. Note that Goldberger's Internet provider was a Pennsylvania
company. See id. at *3. "Domain name" is part of the Internet's addressing system
and means that
[the] host computer providing Internet services ("site") has a unique In-
ternet address. Users seeking to exchange digital information (electronic
mail ("e-mail"), computer programs, images, music) with a particular In-
ternet host require the host's address in order to establish a connection.
Hosts actually possess two fungible addresses: a numeric "IP" address such
as 123.456.123.12, and an alphanumeric "domain name" such as
15
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construction and provided only information about an upcoming
business venture of Goldberger's. 119
The parties disputed personal jurisdiction. After jurisdic-
tional discovery, the court concluded that "[u]nless and until
Congress or the New York legislature enacts Internet specific
jurisdictional legislation, the Court must employ New York's ex-
isting jurisdictional statutes," and merely "analogize to pres-
ently existing, traditional, non-Internet personal jurisdiction
case law."120 The court found the web site similar to an adver-
tisement in a national magazine and, on the basis that New
York's long-arm statute is restrictive, concluded that the stat-
ute did not permit a finding of personal jurisdiction.' 2' In re-
sponse to the suggestion that the Internet could act as a
constitutionally sufficient contact, the court expressed concerns
about offending traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice in light of the fact that a web site would lead to nation-
wide jurisdiction.122
In Weber v. Jolly Hotels,123 New Jersey's District Court con-
sidered whether a finding of general jurisdiction could be made
against an Italian hotel operator with its principal place of busi-
microsoft.com, with greater mnemonic potential . . . . Internet domain
names are similar to telephone number mnemonics, but they are of greater
importance, since there is no satisfactory Internet equivalent to a telephone
company white pages or directory assistance, and domain names can often
be guessed. A domain name mirroring a corporate name may be a valuable
corporate asset, as it facilitates communication with a customer base. The
uniqueness of Internet addresses is ensured by the registration services of
the Internet Network Information Center ("Internic") ....
See id. at *2 (quoting MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 204, n.2.
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
119. See Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097, at *4. Goldberger had undertaken to
develop a site which would "offer law office infrastructure network services for at-
torneys." Id. at *3.
120. Id. at *7.
121. See id. at *10; see also Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977
F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding, among other things, that an Internet adver-
tisement alone is not enough to open the defendant to personal jurisdiction in New
York). Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), an advertisement is not a sufficient basis
under which to find personal jurisdiction. See Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097, at *10.
The court noted that there was ample case law supporting its contention that
"[elven advertisements targeted at the New York market have been found to be
insufficient for C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) transaction of business jurisdiction." Id. at *11
(citations omitted).
122. See id. at *15.
123. 977 F. Supp. 327 (D. N.J. 1997).
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ness in Italy. 124 The plaintiff planned and booked a vacation to
Italy through a Massachusetts travel agency. 125 The plaintiffs
suit stemmed from injuries sustained from a fall at the Jolly
Diodoro Hotel in Italy.126 The defendant maintained an In-
ternet site providing telephone numbers and descriptions of ho-
tel properties and rooms. 127 The plaintiff argued that general
jurisdiction was proper in New Jersey because the "defendant's
use of the Internet is equivalent to advertising in New
Jersey.' 28
The court ruled against the plaintiff holding that an In-
ternet page with an advertisement was not a sufficient basis for
general jurisdiction. 129 In so finding, the court established a
sliding-scale of categories to be used in determining whether ju-
risdiction exists based on cyberspace contacts. 30 In the first
category, defendant "actively" engages in business on the In-
ternet,'3 ' and therefore personal jurisdiction is proper because
the defendant engages in repeated and knowing transmissions
of materials via the Internet to a domiciliary of the forum
state. 132 The second category deals with situations in which a
defendant engages in information exchanges with a computer
within the forum state.133 Here, jurisdiction depends on the na-
ture and extent of the exchanges.134 In the third category the
web site is passive and provides only advertisements and infor-
mation and therefore a finding of jurisdiction is prohibited't 1
124. See id. at 329. New Jersey's long-arm statute is similar to that of Califor-
nia's, running to the limits of the constitution. See id. at 330.
125. See id. at 329.
126. See id. at 329-30.
127. See Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. at 329.
128. Id. at 331. Plaintiff also alleged specific jurisdiction, asserting that the
contract with the Massachusetts travel agency resulted in defendant "stand[ing] in
the shoes" of the travel agency, which was an independent contractor. Id.
129. See id. at 333-34.
130. See id. at 333.
131. See Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. at 333 (citing Compuserve v. Patterson, 89
F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996)).
132. See Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. at 333 (citation omitted).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 333 (citing Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F.
Supp. 1119 (W.D. Penn. 1997) (additional citation omitted)).
135. See Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. at 334 (citing Hearst Corporation v. Gold-
berger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997)).
17
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The court reasoned that the defendant's activities fell into the
third category and thus refused to exercise jurisdiction. 136
In Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,137 the District Court
considered whether a third-party's web site, carrying advertise-
ments from Boto and Everstar Manufacturing, was a sufficient
basis upon which to exercise personal jurisdiction. 138 In this
wrongful death action, Smith, as administrator, sued Hobby
Lobby Stores in Arkansas. 139 Hobby Lobby stores sold the dece-
dent an artificial Christmas tree that may have been the cause
of a deadly fire. 140 The defendant purchased the tree through
Boto and Everstar Manufacturing, and sued those parties for
indemnification in Arkansas.14' Boto was a foreign corporation
doing business in Hong Kong and did not have any customers
with a principal place of business in Arkansas. 42 All sales
made to American companies were shipped from Hong Kong,
free on board, to a port of the customer's choosing. 43 However,
Boto's managing director testified that it "was foreseeable that
136. See Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. at 333. The court transferred the case to
the Southern District of New York, under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), since defendant's
subsidiary owns a hotel in New York. See id. at 334.
137. 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997).
138. See id. at 1361. The Arkansas long-arm statute is similar to that of Cali-
fornia's, extending to the reaches of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
See id. at 1359.
139. See id. at 1358.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 1357-59. Note that Hobby Lobby Stores originally filed a third-
party complaint that was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Hobby
Lobby, 968 F. Supp. at 1358. The court subsequently allowed Hobby Lobby Stores
to amend its third-party complaint and required the parties to undertake "expe-
dited" jurisdictional discovery. See id. "Thus the sole question [was] whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause." Id. at
1359.
142. See id. at 1358.
143. See id. The court noted Boto's sales to American companies as follows:
(in Hong Kong dollars) approximately $187 million for the year ending March 31,
1993; $171 million for the year ending March 31, 1994; $241 million for the year
ending March 31, 1995; $328 million for the year ending March 31, 1996; and $415
million for the year ending March 31, 1997. See Hobby Lobby, 968 F. Supp. at
1361. Hobby Lobby Stores' business with Boto included: $2.3 million in purchases
in 1995, with 101,100 trees bought; and $3.0 million in purchases in 1996. See id.
Boto utilized a distribution system in the United States, but did not direct the
location of its products in the States. See id. at 1363- 64.
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Boto's products could end up in any state in the United
States ."144
Boto advertised in Hong Kong Enterprise, a monthly trade
publication, that was available in print and on the Internet. 145
Boto's advertisement in the publication also appeared on the
publication's web page.146 Plaintiff contended that while Boto
may have had little other ties to Arkansas, the Internet site
constituted a "significant connection[ ]" with the forum state.147
Boto disagreed, asserting that the Internet site was only an ad-
vertisement and "surely does not mean that a company is sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction at each and every location on the
planet where someone is capable of logging on the Internet."148
The court ruled against plaintiff. 49 It concluded that "Boto did
not contract to sell any goods or services to any citizens of Ar-
kansas over the Internet site."150 Thus, the Internet site was
held to be an insufficient minimum contact.' 5'
As early as 1994, Florida began struggling with the extent
to which computer transfers of information would result in per-
sonal jurisdiction.' 52 In Pres-Kap v.System One, Direct Access,
the court determined that a New York travel agency (Pres-Kap)
should not be subject to Florida's jurisdiction based on its access
to a travel information database located in Miami. 5 3 The court
was not persuaded that such a "contact" could convert what it
determined to be a New York transaction into a Florida one.15 4
One judge dissenting, however, found that the defendant could
have reasonably anticipated being haled into Florida to answer
suit.'55
144. Id.
145. See id. at 1361.
146. See Hobby Lobby, 968 F. Supp. at 1361.
147. Id. at 1363.
148. Id. at 1364.
149. See id. at 1365-66.
150. Id. at 1365.
151. See Hobby Lobby, 968 F. Supp. at 1365.
152. See Pres-Kap v. System One, Direct Access, 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994), rehearing denied, 645 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1994).
153. See id. at 1352-54.
154. See id. at 1353.
155. See id. at 1354 (Barkdull, J., dissenting).
167
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2. While the potential may be world-wide jurisdiction, it
is sometimes the case that a defendant expected or
desired his web site be accessed in a foreign
forum, or used on the Internet to his
benefit, and so a finding of minimum contacts is not
de facto unconstitutional
In People v. Lipsitz,156 a case of nationwide first impression,
the New York State Attorney General sought enforcement of
consumer fraud and false advertising laws against the defend-
ant for his practices targeting an Internet audience with the use
of e-mail. 157 The charges stemmed from the defendant's busi-
ness of selling magazine subscriptions but failing to deliver the
orders promptly and for the duration paid. 58 The State alleged
that the defendant was pocketing the subscription money. 59 In
concluding that it had jurisdiction, 60 the court rejected a con-
tention that "traditional jurisdictional standards" are insuffi-
cient to deal with the Internet problem. 16' Instead, the court
remarked that traditional standards are able to resolve even
novel jurisdictional issues. 162
In Playboy Enterprises v. Chuckleberry Publishing,63 while
enforcing an injunction against a trademark infringing Italian
company, a District Court in New York, although not in connec-
tion with a personal jurisdiction motion, commented that
"[c]yberspace is not a 'safe haven"' from which to avoid civil lia-
bility. 64 The court also discovered that customers were not re-
sponsible for "pulling" the information from the Internet, rather
the information was distributed by the web page creator. 65
156. 663 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
157. See id. at 470.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. The court so concluded since the respondents reside in New York state.
See id. at 473. In dicta, however, the court discussed the concept of personal juris-
diction for civil matters arising when defendants do not reside in the forum state.
See Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
161. See id.
162. See id. (citing Richard S. Zembek, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Funda-
mental Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALBANY L.J. SCIENCE &
TECH. 339 (1996)).
163. 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
164. Id. at 1040.
165. See id. at 1039.
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Therefore, the defendant's actions were not confined to Italy
where it had established and maintained the web site. 166
In Cody v. Ward,167 Connecticut's District Court concluded
that alleged misrepresentations made through e-mails consti-
tuted sufficient minimum contacts to subject a California resi-
dent to suit in Connecticut. 168 The court considered a
Connecticut resident's claim that he was duped into buying
about $200,000 worth of stock in a company that later went
bankrupt.169 The plaintiff originally learned of the opportunity
over the Internet from the defendant's 225 posted messages, on
general access electronic bulletin boards and was further in-
formed by the defendant's telephone calls and e-mails.170 Turn-
ing to the due process arguments, the court determined that the
sheer quantity of messages between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant, and the amount of money involved, should have rea-
sonably indicated to the defendant that he would be subject to
suit in Connecticut. 171 Based on the rationale that technological
advances provide conveniences, answering suit in Connecticut
would not be unfair.172
In State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.,173 a Minnesota court
determined that an Internet site may constitute a sufficient ba-
sis upon which to assert personal jurisdiction. 174 There, the de-
fendant Rogers, a Nevada resident, advertised on his web site
166. See id. at 1044.
167. 954 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1997).
168. See id. at 45.
169. See id. at 44-5.
170. See id. at 45.
171. See id. at 47. The court found that Connecticut's long-arm statute ap-
plied. See Cody, 954 F. Supp. at 45-6.
172. See id. at 47. The court noted that:
[tihe widespread use of facsimile equipment and overnight mail and the
courts' increasing use of telephone conferences in lieu of live conferences
reduces the burden on nonresidents of litigating in a distant state. Even
depositions can be done by telephone. If telephone depositions are objection-
able for some reason, a plaintiff can be required to pay or at least share
travel costs associated with depositions in appropriate cases .... If a plain-
tiffs case has sufficient merit to survive a motion for summary judgment,
requiring the defendant to bear the burden of traveling to the plaintiffs
state for trial makes at least as much sense as requiring the plaintiff to do
the traveling.
Id. at 47 n.9.
173. 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
174. See id. at 721.
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that an Internet gambling service web page would be coming
soon. 175 Rogers designed and operated the page, but the gam-
bling company was based in Belize. 176 While the gambling pro-
gram was not yet available, the web site offered those accessing
it the opportunity to subscribe for additional information, and
provided a 1-800 number to call a person in Belize, or a Nevada
number to reach the defendant Rogers. 177 On the web page, the
defendant claimed that gambling on-line was legal.'78 Minne-
sota's Attorney General filed a complaint alleging the statement
amounted to an act of consumer fraud.179
In affirming the lower court's finding that Minnesota could
retain personal jurisdiction, 8 0 the court analyzed the circum-
stances in light of the Due Process Clause of the Federal Consti-
tution.'8 ' The court relied on both the quantity and quality of
contacts with the forum.'8 2 For example, during a two-week pe-
riod in 1996, at least 248 Minnesota computers accessed the
site, and at least one Minnesota resident's name was added to
the mailing list.183 As to the quality of the contacts, the court
noted that "users are essential to the success of its service.
Clearly, [the defendant] has obtained the web site for the pur-
pose of, and in anticipation that, internet users, searching the
internet for web sites, will access [the defendant's] web site and
eventually sign up on [the defendant's] mailing list."8 4 Accord-
ingly, the defendant may not "hide behind the structuring of its
175. See id. at 716.
176. See id.
177. See id. Subscribers were added to a mailing list. See Granite Gate Re-
sorts, 568 N.W.2d at 718-20. The Minnesota Attorney General's office, as part of
its investigation, added itself to the mailing list under an employee's name. See id.
at 721.
178. See id. at 720.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 721. The lower court's ruling may be found at State by
Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1997 WL 767431 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996).
181. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 718. The court noted that Min-
nesota's long-arm statute runs to the limits of the Due Process Clause of the fed-
eral Constitution. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 718-19.
184. See id. at 719. The court's analysis is reminiscent of the comment by the
Playboy court which also noted the commercial intent behind the establishment of
Internet sites. See Playboy Enterprises v. Chuckleberry Publishing, 939 F. Supp.
1032, 1040-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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distribution system" when evidence exists that the defendant
intended to enter into the forum state. 85
In a case of first impression in Missouri, the District Court
in Maritz v. Cybergold,8 6 determined that a web site soliciting
names for a mailing list was a sufficient contact with the state
to subject the defendant to suit in Missouri. 8 7 The defendant
established a web site in California allegedly using a trade-
marked name. 88 After dispensing with the long-arm statute
component of the jurisdiction test, 8 9 the court concluded that
the due process standard would not be offended by asserting
personal jurisdiction against the defendant because he know-
ingly transmitted information across several state lines with
the hope of gaining a comprehensive mailing list.190 Despite the
fact that the web page was only an advertisement, the court
found that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice" would not be offended with an assertion of personal
jurisdiction.' 91
In Digital Equipment Corp. v. Alta Vista Technology, 92 the
Massachusetts District Court concluded that an Internet pres-
ence is a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction. 93 In Decem-
ber 1995, Digital Equipment ("Digital"), a Massachusetts
company, established an Internet search engine under the
name "AltaVista." 94 Digital acquired the rights to use that
name by contract with ATI in March of 1996.195 ATI was a Cali-
fornia corporation and one of the defendants in this action. 96
The licensing agreement between Digital and ATI required that
any dispute arising out of it must be resolved under Massachu-
setts law. 197 The agreement also provided that ATI was to re-
185. See Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d at 720 (quoting Rostad v. On-Deck,
Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 1985)).
186. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
187. See id. at 1330.
188. See id. at 1329-30.
189. See id. at 1329; see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 506.500 (West 1997).
190. See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330-31.
191. Id. at 1334.
192. 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997).
193. See id. at 465-66.
194. See id. at 459.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See Digital Equipment, 960 F. Supp. at 464.
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frain from using "AltaVista" as "the name of a product or service
offering."198 ATI continued to maintain a web site with the
name "AltaVista" visible to the viewer. 199 Below the name ban-
ner, ATI offered software for sale.200 ATI did not mention its
own corporate name on the web site.20 ' There was a hyperlink
on the web page that connected the viewer to Digital's Alta
Vista search engine. 20 2 A portion of Digital's claim was that
ATI's web site "look[s], feel[s], and function[s]" much like Digi-
tal's Alta Vista site. 203 Accordingly, Digital alleged that ATI's
web site constituted trademark infringement and unfair
competition. 20 4
ATI filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, but the court rejected it.205 While the court was concerned
with the nature of the Internet and its impact on the expecta-
tions of corporations doing business in a free economy, ATI's
web activities brought them "over the line."20 6 Accordingly, the
court dismissed the defendant's motion, holding that personal
jurisdiction in Massachusetts was foreseeable to the
defendant. 20 7
3. Although there is the potential for world-wide
jurisdiction, a defendant who establishes a web
site has knowledge of the nature of the
Internet and thus cannot claim to be
surpised that he must answer a claim in a foreign
forum
In American Network, Inc. v. Access America,208 a New York
case, the District Court retained personal jurisdiction over a
Georgia corporation that conducted its business over the In-
198. Id. at 474 (quoting the licensing agreement).
199. See id. at 460.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See Digital Equipment, 960 F. Supp. at 461.
203. Id. at 461.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 464.
206. Id. at 463.
207. See Digital Equipment, 960 F. Supp. at 463. The court expressly rejected
that it was ruling on the general topic of the Internet and personal jurisdiction, but
instead narrowed its holding to the facts at bar. See id. at 463.
208. 975 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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ternet, even though the corporation maintained only 0.08% of
its business in New York.20 9 The defendant was an Internet ac-
cess provider allegedly infringing on the plaintiffs domain
name.210 Other than total revenues of $150 per month from
New York subscribers (less than 10% of its subscriptions busi-
ness), the defendant maintained no other ties with the state ex-
cept an Internet web site available to anyone accessing the
Internet.211 However, the web site advertised that the defend-
ant could grant anyone across America access to the Internet. 21 2
The court ruled that New York's long-arm statute require-
ments were satisfied. 21 3 Since the defendant dealt with some
New York subscribers and had prior knowledge of plaintiffs
trademark, it was reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's
alleged infringement would have an effect in New York.214 In
turning to the due process arguments, the court considered that
a defendant who merely publishes a web site should not be sub-
ject to jurisdiction in the forum state, unless the defendant
maintained additional contacts in New York.215 In addition to
the monthly subscription fees from the state, the defendant
mailed software into New York in response to requests from
New York subscribers. 2 6 Therefore, the defendant could have
avoided suit in New York by refusing to do business with New
York residents. 217 Further supporting the court's conclusion
209. See id. at 496.
210. See id. at 495-96. Plaintiffs domain name was "American.Net" while de-
fendant's was "America.Net". See id. at 496.
211. See id.
212. See Access America, 975 F. Supp. at 496.
213. See id. at 498 (finding that the defendant's act without the state had con-
sequences within the state and that defendant could have foreseen such conse-
quences within New York); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii) (McKinney 1997);
supra note 22.
214. See Access America, 975 F. Supp. at 498. The court determined that N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii) applied in that the defendant committed a tortious act with-
out the state, causing injury within the state, and that the defendant could reason-
ably have anticipated consequences in New York. See id. at 497.
215. See id. at 497-98.
216. See id. at 499.
217. See id. The court observed that since world-wide publication cannot be
avoided once a site is placed on the Internet, other means to reject availment of a
forum state's citizens is required. Accordingly, had the defendant refused to enter
into contracts with New York state residents, the court would likely have received
that assertion as positive evidence of the defendant's unwillingness to open itself
to jurisdiction in New York. See Access America, 975 F. Supp. at 499.
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was the defendant's advertisement that he was willing to assist
anyone across the United States.218 Finally, the court deter-
mined that it would be fair to litigate in New York.219 The sec-
ond prong of the due process analysis did not prevent a finding
of personal jurisdiction considering the state's manifest interest
in providing residents with a convenient forum in which to liti-
gate the matter.220
In Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set Inc. ,221 the Connect-
icut District Court determined that the repetitive nature of In-
ternet advertising constituted a "solicitation of business" under
that state's long-arm statute.222 The defendant was a Massa-
chusetts corporation, and its only contacts with Connecticut
were over the Internet. 223 The plaintiff, owner of the trademark
"INSET," filed suit against the defendant because it registered
"INSET.COM" as a domain name.224
Turning to the constitutional issues, the court recognized
that while a posting on the Internet could result in country-
wide jurisdiction, it nonetheless was a "purposeful availment" of
the laws of the forum state.225 Moreover, because an Internet
posting is continuously available around the clock, it provides
ample constitutional basis to find that the defendant should
reasonably have anticipated being haled into a foreign
jurisdiction. 226
In Hall v. LaRonde,227 the use of the Internet and telephone
created a sufficient basis for the court to assert personal juris-
218. See id. at 495-96.
219. See id. at 499.
220. See id.
221. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
222. See id. at 164. The Connecticut long-arm statute provides, in part, that
personal jurisdiction shall be maintained on any cause of action arising out of "any
business solicited in this state . . . if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited
business . . . . " Id. at 164 (quoting CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 33-411(c)(2) (West 1997)).
223. See Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 162.
224. See id. at 163. The defendant also registered a toll-free telephone
number which, if spelled alphanumerically, reads "1-800-US-INSET." Id.
225. See id. at 165.
226. See id. The court quickly disposed of the second prong of the personal
jurisdiction issue, fair play and substantial justice, noting that Massachusetts and
Connecticut were close to one another and that the forum state has an interest in
providing a forum for its residents. See Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 165.
227. 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Ct. App. 1997).
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diction over a New York corporation. 228 Hall, his principal
place of business in California, entered into a contract with
LaRonde, whose principal place of business was in New York.229
Their contract authorized LaRonde to sell software licenses
owned by Hall.230 One year into the contract, LaRonde contin-
ued to sell licenses, but allegedly failed to submit the contractu-
ally required payments to Hall.231 In his affidavit of opposition
to LaRonde's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
Hall indicated that his first contact with LaRonde was via e-
mail.232 While Hall's first e-mail was an inquiry, LaRonde's re-
sponse via e-mail was "with the idea of integrating Hall's mod-
ule into LaRonde's software package." 233 After the planned
integration was completed, Hall continued to modify it, making
each adjustment from his office in California. 234 Hall also
stated that all contacts with LaRonde were via e-mail and tele-
phone.235 Hall agreed that absent jurisdictional discovery, his
only claim was to assert specific jurisdiction. 236
The court considered technological advancements, such as
e-mail, and reasoned that the methods of transacting business
have changed substantially, especially in light of advancements
in electronic communications. 237 Since "[tihe speed and ease of
such communications has increased the number of transactions
that are consummated without either party leaving the office
... there is no reason why the requisite minimum contacts
cannot be electronic." 238 Since LaRonde reached out to a resi-
dent of California and continued to work with him in developing
and modifying the software package, the court concluded that
"LaRonde created a 'continuing obligation' between himself and
a resident of California" and that his contacts with the forum
228. See id. at 400.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See Hall, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401.
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See Hall, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402.
238. Id.
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state "were more than 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated. '"' 239
Accordingly, minimum contacts had been established with Cali-
fornia.240 Since "minimum contacts" had been established, the
burden shifted to the defendant to present a "compelling case"
against a finding of personal jurisdiction.241 The court con-
cluded that it was neither unreasonable, nor too burdensome,
for the defendant to present himself in a California court.242
Although in Hall a California court authorized personal ju-
risdiction against a foreign defendant based solely on an In-
ternet presence, California recognized a constitutional
limitation.243 In Expert Pages v. Buckalew,244 the court found it
unfair to require the nonresident young adult defendant to de-
fend a suit in California.245 This copyright infringement suit
stemmed from the plaintiffs allegation that its web page was
copied and used by the defendant in his attempt to develop an
on-line information service. 246 The court determined that mini-
mum contacts existed since the defendant purposefully directed
his activities to the plaintiffs web site that was based in Cali-
fornia. 247 However, given the limited contacts the defendant
maintained with California, and that the plaintiff corporation
was better able to prosecute its claim in a foreign state, the
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction would have deprived the
defendant of his right to defend himself.248
In Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,249 it
was concluded that an Internet provider who conducted "elec-
tronic commerce" with 3000 residents of the forum state had
purposefully availed himself of the forum's laws and was there-
fore "doing business" within the state.250 Zippo Manufacturing
239. Id. (quoting Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-
76 (1985)).
240. See Hall, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402.
241. Id. (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).
242. See Hall, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403. The court also indicated that
LaRonde's claim of excessive burden was "late." See id. at 402.
243. See id. at 402.
244. No. C-97-2109-VRW, 1997 WL 488011 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1997).
245. See id. at *4-5.
246. See id. at *1.
247. See id. at *3.
248. See id. at *4-5.
249. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
250. See id. at 1125-26.
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sued under several trademark infringement theories, stemming
from Zippo Dot Com's use of the domain names "zippo.com" and
other similar names.251 Zippo Dot Com, a California Internet
provider, maintained no affiliations with Pennsylvania, other
than through its subscribers, who had been made aware of the
provider solely by advertisements on the Internet. 252 The de-
fendant did not otherwise solicit business from the forum
state. 2
53
The court recognized that business, as a result of the In-
ternet, could now be conducted from a person's desktop. 254 The
court stated that :
[t]raditionally, when an entity intentionally reaches beyond its
boundaries to conduct business with foreign residents, the exer-
cise of specific jurisdiction is proper. [citation omitted]. Different
results should not be reached simply because business is con-
ducted over the Internet. 255
Due to the fact that the defendant continued to accept business
from forum domicilaries, the court rejected the defendant's ar-
gument that its contacts with the forum state were
"fortuitous ."256
In Telco Communications v. An Apple A Day,257 the Virginia
District Court concluded that a web site was a sufficient basis
upon which to assert personal jurisdiction against a Missouri
corporation.258 The defendant posted allegedly defamatory
press releases on its Missouri-based web site, allegedly result-
251. See id. at 1121.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123.
255. Id. at 1124 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985)).
256. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123, 1126 (quoting World Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)). The court's observation may suggest that
defendant could have avoided a finding of personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania
had he expressly refused to conduct business with Pennsylvania residents. The
court seems to suggest that a web site for advertising alone may not be sufficient
grounds for asserting personal jurisdiction.
257. 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997).
258. See id. at 408. The court noted that Virginia's long-arm statute runs
nearly to the limits of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. See id. at 406-
07. Personal jurisdiction is limited slightly in that it provides that a defendant
acting outside the state must solicit, or regularly solicit, business within the state.
See id. at 407 (citations omitted).
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ing in depressed stock prices for the plaintiff.259 The court ruled
that two or three press releases placed on the Internet, for the
purposes of advertising, rises to the level of "regularly doing or
soliciting business." 260 The court reasoned that "but for" the In-
ternet transmissions, the alleged tort would not have occurred
in the forum state.261 The court rejected any contention that the
defendant would be unfairly prejudiced by having to defend a
suit in Virginia.262 -The court reasoned that defendant should
have known that the information would disseminate into Vir-
ginia, particularly because the plaintiff was headquartered in
that state. 263
In Edias Software International v. Basis International,264
the Arizona District Court found that an Internet web page con-
stituted a constitutionally sufficient contact in the context of a
libel and defamation action.265 The defendant was alleged to
have posted a message on its web page indicating that the
plaintiff, Edias Software, performed inadequately under a dis-
tribution contract.266 In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction, the court considered whether posting
the message on the web page was a constitutional contact. 267
Since Arizona was Edias' principal place of business, the court
reasoned that the defendant "could foresee that the result of the
statements might be to deter potential Edias customers [and]
that the injury might be felt in Arizona."268 In ruling that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper, the court stated
that the defendant could not simultaneously rely on modern
technology to disseminate information while escaping "tradi-
tional notions of jurisdiction."269
259. See id. at 404.
260. Telco Communications, 977 F. Supp. at 406. In dicta, the court also ac-
cepted the Internet as a valid contact for purposes of personal jurisdiction under
its long-arm statute requiring tortious act or injury within the state. See id. at
409.
261. See id. at 408.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
265. See id. at 420.
266. See id. at 415.
267. See id. at 419.
268. Id. at 420.
269. Edias Software, 947 F. Supp. at 420.
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In Compuserve Inc. v. Patterson,270 the Sixth Circuit enter-
tained an action brought by Compuserve seeking a declaratory
judgment that it had not violated any trademark infringement
laws against Patterson.27' Compuserve was an Ohio corpora-
tion engaged in the business of computer networking for In-
ternet access. 272 It entered into a contract with Patterson to
provide access to the Internet for Patterson's shareware
software.27 3 Patterson also advertised his shareware over the
Internet.27 4
In 1993, Patterson demanded approximately $100,000 from
Compuserve to settle his potential trademark infringement
claims stemming from his belief that software developed by
Compuserve was similar to his own.275 To stave off a suit, Com-
puserve filed this action for declaratory judgment in Ohio fed-
eral court, seeking an equitable determination that its software
was not an infringement. 276 Patterson made a motion to dis-
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 277
The court recognized the decreasing role of the Federal
Constitution in preventing inconvenient litigation since "all but
the most remote forums are easily accessible for the pursuit of
both business and litigation."278 Accordingly, the court ruled
that specific personal jurisdiction was proper under the circum-
stances.27 9 It determined that Patterson had purposefully
270. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
271. See id. at 1259.
272. See id. at 1260.
273. See id. "Shareware," as this court described,
makes money only through the voluntary compliance of an 'end user,' that
is, another CompuServe subscriber who may or may not pay the creator's
suggested licensing fee if she uses the software beyond a specified trial pe-
riod. The 'end user' pays that fee directly to CompuServe in Ohio, and Com-
puServe takes a 15% fee for its trouble before remitting the balance to the
shareware's creator.
Id. The defendant Patterson had developed software which he provided to con-
sumers, as shareware, via Compuserve. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1260.
274. See id. at 1261.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id. The motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was
granted by the district court. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1261. Compuserve ap-
pealed. See id.
278. Id. at 1262 (citations omitted).
279. See id. at 1267-68. Ohio's long-arm statute allows the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonresidents on claims arising out of the nonresident's
179
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availed himself of the laws of Ohio when he chose to create a
connection with Ohio2 ° through repeatedly sending his
software through electronic channels to Compuserve in Ohio, 28'
and advertising his shareware over Compuserve's system.28 2
The court found purposeful availment despite the fact that be-
tween 1991 and 1994 Patterson sold through Compuserve less
than $650.00 worth of his software to twelve Ohio residents. 28 3
The court also recognized Ohio's interest in providing Com-
puserve with a forum for litigation.28 4
III. The Bensusan Decision 28 5
In 1996, the plaintiff corporation, Bensusan, brought a
trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair com-
petition action against the defendant, King.28 6 Bensusan al-
leged that his trademark and logo - "The Blue Note" - were
transaction of business in Ohio. See id. at 1262 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.382(A)). "Transacting business" has been construed to run to the limits of
the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at
1262. (citations omitted).
280. The court found that Patterson's choice to transmit files to Compuserve
in Ohio was the most "salient" fact for finding personal jurisdiction. See id. at
1264.
281. The court also found the repeated nature of the transmissions into Ohio
to be of significance, suggesting that the district court, in granting Patterson's mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, disregarded the fact that Patter-
son's involvement with Ohio was not a "one-shot affair." See id. at 1261 (citation
omitted).
282. See id. at 1264.
283. See id. at 1261
284. See Patterson, 89 F.3d. at 1268. The court also devoted a small portion of
its decision to indicating what it was not deciding in the case. See id. at 1268.
Among other things, the court was not holding that Patterson could be subject to
suit in any state where his shareware was made available through Compuserve's
computers, or whether Compuserve could sue in Ohio a subscriber from Alaska
who had never done more than access Compuserve's regular Internet services. See
id.
285. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), af/d, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
286. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 298. This Note focuses on the lower
court's decision since it, in dicta, considered New York's position as to whether an
Internet presence is a sufficient minimum contact. See id. at 300-01. Although it
affirmed, the Second Circuit did so without reaching the constitutional question.
See Bensusan, 126 F.3d at 26-27. However, the Second Circuit indicated that "we
believe that well-established doctrines of personal jurisdiction law support the re-
sult reached by the district court." Id.
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improperly used on King's Internet web page.28 7 Bensusan is a
New York corporation and the creator of a New York city jazz
club named "The Blue Note."288 Bensusan is the rightful owner
of the federally registered mark of the same name. 28 9 King is an
individual who owns and operates a night club in Columbia,
Missouri, named "The Blue Note. '290
King's web site was a general access site, meaning that it
required no passwords and had no other access-restricting de-
vices.291 In addition to general club information and calendar
dates, the site provided ticket information for the club which
included names and numbers of local ticket agents and a tele-
phone number for phone ticket orders. 292 The site also men-
tioned The Blue Note of New York in a disclaimer.293 King also
included a hyperlink permitting users to connect directly to
Bensusan's web page. 294
Bensusan brought the action in the Southern District of
New York.295 King moved to dismiss the action for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"). 296 Initially, the court considered
the long-arm statute requirements, specifically whether "the
creation of a Web site, which exists either in Missouri or in
287. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 297. According to the trial court,
[iun April of 1996, King posted a "site" on the World-Wide Web of the in-
ternet to promote his club. This Web site, which is located on a computer
server in Missouri, allegedly contains "a fanciful logo which is substantially
similar to the logo utilized by [Bensusan]."
Id.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 297.
292. See id.
293. See id. The disclaimer indicated that "The Blue Note's Cyberspot should
not be confused with one of the world's finest jazz club [s] [the] Blue Note, located in
the heart of New York's Greenwich Village. If you should find yourself in the big
apple give them a visit." Id. at 297-98. "After Bensusan objected to the Web site,
King dropped the sentence 'If you should find yourself in the big apple give them a
visit' from the disclaimer and removed the hyperlink." Id. "Hyperlink" is a tool in
which "highlighted text or images that, when selected by the user, permit him to
view another, related Web document.'" Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 298 n.2 (quoting
Shaw v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
294. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 298.
295. See id. at 297.
296. See id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) (McKinney 1997).
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cyberspace-i.e., anywhere the Internet exists-with a tele-
phone number to order the allegedly infringing product, is an
offer to sell the product in New York."297 The court sustained
the defendant's motion on statutory grounds. 298 The court rea-
soned that the New York resident would have to take "several
affirmative steps" to access the site and would then have to tele-
phone the club in Missouri to reserve tickets, and travel to Mis-
souri to see a show. 299 Moreover, the alleged infringement was
deemed to have occurred in Missouri, not New York.300 "The
mere fact that a person can gain information on the allegedly
infringing product is not the equivalent of a person advertising,
promoting, selling, or otherwise making an effort to target its
product in New York."301 According to the court, no tortious act
was committed within New York and consequently C.P.L.R.
302(a)(2) did not apply. 302
The court also found that C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii) did not pro-
vide a basis for personal jurisdiction. 30 3 King submitted an affi-
davit stating that ninety-nine percent of his business is derived
from local residents. 30 4 Subsequently, the court determined
that the statutory requirement that substantial revenues be de-
rived from interstate commerce was not satisfied.305 The court
also rejected Bensusan's claim that it was foreseeable that
domiciliaries of New York would access the site.306
In dicta, the court considered the personal jurisdiction
question under due process requirements. 30 7 The court's opin-
297. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 299.
298. See id.
299. Id.
300. See id.
301. Id. at 299.
302. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 299.
303. See id. 302(a)(3)(ii) provides that acts committed by nondomiciliaries
which the nondomiciliary "expects or should reasonably expect [] have conse-
quences in the state and [from which the nondomiciliary] derives substantial reve-
nue from interstate or international commerce" generate a basis for personal
jurisdiction. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii) (McKinney 1997).
304. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300.
305. See id.; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii) (McKinney 1997).
306. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300. The court emphasized that "[that
prong of the statute requires that a defendant make a 'discernable effort . . .to
serve, directly or indirectly, a market in the forum state."' Id. (quoting Darienzo v.
Wise Shoe Stores, 427 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834 (App. Div. 1980)).
307. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300.
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ion was that King "had done nothing to purposefully avail him-
self of the benefits of New York,"30 8 reasoning that an Internet
site could not be "directed" to anyone in New York, but was
spread worldwide. 30 9 Thus this activity was "insufficient to sat-
isfy due process." 310 As to Bensusan's argument that King
should have foreseen people in New York reading the site and
becoming confused about the rightful ownership of the trade-
mark, the court concluded it was an insufficient argument upon
which to rest a finding of personal jurisdiction. 311
Bensusan appealed, but the Second Circuit affirmed the
dismissal.31 2 The Second Circuit, however, did not reach the
due process issue.31 3 Instead, that court relied on an analysis
similar to the lower court's in finding the long-arm statute in
New York inapplicable. 314
IV. Analysis
A. Advertising on the World-Wide Web Constitutes a Valid
Contact: The Error of Bensusan
Why advertise on the Internet but to solicit clients and in-
form people (and the world) of your presence? King, wishing to
advertise to locals, might have opted for another form of adver-
tising such as newsprint, radio or local television. A world-wide
audience does not seem necessary to attract local patrons. In
this way, it seems that King "intentionally became part of an
interstate economic network"31 5 for economic gain. King had
knowledge of the plaintiffs club, The Blue Note, as evidenced by
King's use of a similar logo, as well as his web site's disclaimer
that the Missouri club was not affiliated with The Blue Note in
New York.316 These facts tend to show both King's desire for
308. Id.
309. Id. at 301.
310. See id.
311. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300.
312. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
313. See id. at 27.
314. See id. at 27-8.
315. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 315 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See Playboy Enterprises v. Chuckleberry Publishing,
939 F. Supp. 1032, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (advertisement on the Internet consti-
tutes "distribution" within the forum state).
316. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. 297-98.
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commercial gain and his recognition that his club's name might
cause confusion with the one in New York.317 Those same facts
may evidence King's knowledge that his web site would be read
by people in New York, and most likely by people planning to
visit a jazz club in New York City. Thus, King could foresee an
impact in New York.
The Bensusan court improperly applied Justice O'Connor's
Asahi plurality opinion. The court relied on Justice O'Connor's
"stream of commerce plus something more approach" to defeat
Bensusan's claim of jurisdiction based on King's Internet activi-
ties.318 Even under the O'Connor construction, however, it
seems that King introduced his product into the stream of com-
merce and directed it towards the forum. It is hard to draw any
other conclusion other than that the defendant's web site was
placed on the web for the purpose of soliciting business. 3'9 King
knew, or should have known, the nature of the distribution sys-
tem known as the world-wide web. 320 King also knew that some
confusion with the plaintiffs club, The Blue Note, may result
from the web site, and therefore King tried to limit that confu-
sion.32' Consequently, it seems King did more than just place
something into the stream of commerce; King created a link be-
tween himself and The Blue Note in New York.322
The district court in Bensusan, in dicta, refused to find per-
sonal jurisdiction partly on the basis that King's Internet page
did not represent any intent to solicit business in, or otherwise
make any connection with, New York.323 However, the defend-
ant is likely to have been aware that some New Yorkers would
317. See supra Part III and accompanying text.
318. See supra Part III and accompanying text.
319. See supra Part III and accompanying text.
320. See supra Part II.C and accompanying text.
321. See supra Part III and accompanying text.
322. See Gwenn M. Kalow, From the Internet to Court: Exercising Jurisdiction
Over World-Wide Web Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241 (1997). Kalow
argues that Justice O'Connor's approach in Asahi should be the test of choice in
Internet cases. See id. at 2270. She argues that the mere placement of a web site
on the Internet would never satisfy due process requirements, especially because it
would be unreasonable to do so. See id. at 2272. Kalow's argument, however, fails
to consider the intention of a web site creator in placing his advertisement on the
Internet.
323. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300-01
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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visit the site to learn more about and possibly purchase tickets
from the jazz club in Missouri. Consider EDIAS Software Int'l
v. BASIS Int'l, 324 in which the court concluded that because the
web page referred to a person in the forum state (who was alleg-
edly defamed by the statement about him), the defendant must
have foreseen the consequences within the forum state. 325 As in
EDIAS, therefore, it seems King's inclusion of a disclaimer, and
information about the New York jazz club, suggested that he
was able to foresee some consequences in New York.
If the Bensusan court's application of Justice O'Connor's
opinion was correct, the defendants will have found a means of
reaching potential clients and improperly utilizing trademarked
names, without concern of being haled into a foreign forum.326
As this result is undesirable, a more prudent application under
Justice O'Connor's analysis would be to consider the placement
of a web site on the Internet similar to placing a product into
the stream of commerce with purposeful availment. Without
question, a web site offers "advertising in the forum State," as
well as "channels for providing regular advice" two factors
which Justice O'Connor's approach requires in order to demon-
strate purposeful availment. 327 Even though the result may be
to assert jurisdiction over more territory, 328 the result seems
logically necessary under Justice O'Connor's approach and it is
not inconsistent with personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. 329
Under Justice Brennan's more relaxed Asahi approach, 330
the Bensusan court's decision was also erroneous. King likely
knew, or should have known, that the "currents or eddies"331 of
Internet information distribution would carry his message into
324. 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996). See supra note 263 and accompanying
text.
325. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
326. This notion seems to run contrary to an implied purpose of the doctrine of
personal jurisdiction, namely to force defendants to act responsibly in a forum so
that the forum's residents may be protected from harm. Failing to act in such
manner, defendants face the threat of having to litigate in an inconvenient forum.
327. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
328. The fears attendant to this conclusion, however, may be calmed when the
analysis turns to the reasonableness test. See infra Part IV.C.1 and accompanying
text.
329. See infra Part IV.C.1 and accompanying text.
330. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116-21 (1987).
331. See id.
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New York.3 3 2 Moreover, knowing that The Blue Note club oper-
ated in New York with a similar logo, it should not have sur-
prised King that he may have to defend a lawsuit there. Lastly,
King's use of the plaintiffs trade name and logo provided him
with the potential of economic gain, through name recognition.
Therefore, King may be said to benefit indirectly from New
York's law facilitating plaintiffs business there.
The Bensusan court's decision also disregarded the spirit of
International Shoe and its progeny, dictating that personal ju-
risdiction ought not be grounded in territorial boundaries. 333
While the Due Process Clause provides certainty and a degree
of predictability for potential defendants, it must not do so at
the expense of states' rights.33 4 Unlike a car that may or may
not be driven into a foreign state,335 the predominant character-
istic of the Internet is world-wide circulation. 336 Arguably, the
Internet provides a degree of predictability that a person's
message will be circulated to every person accessing it around
the world. Such vast distribution is likely the appeal in initiat-
ing an Internet presence. Knowledge of the distribution system
makes a defendant's web site anything but a "random," "fortui-
tous," or "attenuated" contact with a forum. 337 The fact that the
contact is electronic should not convert an otherwise valid con-
tact into an invalid one.338
332. See supra Part II.C and accompanying text.
333. See supra Part II.B and accompanying text.
334. See Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930); World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
335. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
336. See supra note 11.
337. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citing
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)); World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 299.
338. See, e.g., Hall v. LaRonde, 66 Cal. Rptr .2d 399 (Ct. App. 1997).
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B. Recognizing Internet Contacts as Constitutionally Valid
Ones: What it Means for the Personal Jurisdiction
Question
The fact that both a large company339 and a young adult at
home340 using the Internet may be considered "present" any-
where in the nation presents unique strains on the minimum
contacts analysis. The potential for inequalities are abundant
since the young adult on an opposite coast may not be given an
opportunity to defend himself adequately. The fear of litigation
in a foreign forum may shape the way small companies do busi-
ness. This could be the impact on a free economy that the court
warned of in Digital Equipment.341 This world-wide reach of ju-
risdiction runs counter to established principles in personal ju-
risdiction jurisprudence. 342 This fear was expressed well by the
Goldberger court when it wrote that personal jurisdiction based
on an Internet web site "would be tantamount to a declaration
that this Court, and every other court throughout the world,
may assert [personal] jurisdiction over all information providers
on the global world-wide web. Such a holding would have a dev-
astating impact on those who use this global service."343
The fear of being haled into every distant court, however,
may be unfounded. The due process analysis established in In-
ternational Shoe and developed in subsequent cases 344 is capa-
ble of preventing unfair assertions of personal jurisdiction, even
after an electronic contact is deemed constitutionally satisfac-
tory. 345 An outright disallowance of electronic contacts as con-
stitutionally valid ones, however, may allow a company to
exercise a freedom to transact interstate business (to the extent
that a web page brings the business advertised to the aware-
ness of foreign residents) without personal jurisdiction conse-
339. See supra Part II.C and accompanying text (discussing Digital Equip-
ment Corp. v. Alta Vista Technology, 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass.1997)).
340. See supra Part II.C and accompanying text (discussing Expert Pages v.
Buckalew, No. C-97-2109-VRW, 1997 WL 488011 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1997)).
341. See Digital Equipment, 960 F. Supp. at 463.
342. See supra Part II.B and accompanying text.
343. Hearst Corporation v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at
*20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (quoting Playboy Enterprises v. Chuckleberry Pub-
lishing, 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
344. See supra Part II.B and accompanying text.
345. See supra Part III.C.1 and accompanying text.
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quences never before permitted in personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence. 346
In the evolution of cases from Pennoyer, through Interna-
tional Shoe, Burger King, World-Wide Volkswagen, and Asahi,
the Court has continually emphasized that the law must be flex-
ible to accommodate changes in technology. 347 Following Pen-
noyer, the Court's interpretation of physical presence has
evolved into an abstract notion that a defendant's products,
placed into the stream of commerce and used in a foreign
state,348 may create constitutionally sufficient "physical" pres-
ence. This expansion of the personal jurisdiction doctrine
should not stop short of the Internet medium.
C. A New Personal Jurisdiction Model for Internet Cases:
Shifting the Analysis to the Reasonableness Test
1. Existing Laws are Capable of Dealing with the
Internet Issue
The current constitutional due process standard is ade-
quate to resolve these new issues. To accommodate the world-
wide web's impact on business, it has been suggested that
"blecause the internet is an entirely new means of information
exchange, analogies to cases involving the use of mail and tele-
phone are less than satisfactory in determining whether [a] de-
fendant has 'purposefully availed' itself to this forum."349
However, from Pennoyer through International Shoe, the Court
has relied on its own understanding of the evolution of business
transactions rather than relying on legislative opinions. 350
Viewing the Internet as a new business tool, subject to present
laws, enables the Court to modify existing laws, rather than
rely on governmental action in developing tailored and untested
new laws.
346. See supra Part II.C and accompanying text.
347. See supra Part II.B and accompanying text.
348. The exact understanding of "stream of commerce" is left at issue in light
of the plurality in Asahi. However, it seems that the Court has advanced to an
understanding that the "stream of commerce" test, in one form or another, is a
standard to be used in personal jurisdiction cases. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
349. Maritz v. Cybergold, 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
350. See supra Part II.B and accompanying text.
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There is very little evidence to support the theory that cur-
rent personal jurisdiction law cannot account for the Internet.
Since the Internet should be considered as a constitutionally
sufficient contact, courts facing the issue ought to place greater
emphasis on the second prong of the International Shoe test.351
This shift would prevent any unfair assertions of personal juris-
diction. Under the traditional test, finding minimum contacts
results in a strong presumption that the assertion of personal
jurisdiction is constitutional. 52 However, this need not be the
case with Internet questions. Specifically, when an Internet
site is proffered as a contact for jurisdictional purposes, espe-
cially in the context of a more passive site and absent additional
conduct directed at the forum, courts should analyze the reason-
ableness factors353 by drawing most inferences in favor of the
defendant. 354 A slight shift in application of the personal juris-
diction test will avoid inequitable and unfair applications of the
International Shoe minimum contacts test. Moreover, it will
not require that an entirely new and untested body of personal
jurisdiction laws be developed.
2. Preserving Defendants' Due Process Rights
Currently, the reasonableness test is secondary to the mini-
mum contacts.355 This has never been interpreted to mean that
the reasonableness test is irrelevant once minimum contacts
have been established. Accordingly, the Court intimated that
the reasonableness test acts to ensure that despite a finding of
351. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980);
supra Part II.B and accompanying text.
352. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985); supra
Part II.B and accompanying text.
353. The reasonableness factors include the "forum State's interest in adjudi-
cating the dispute," World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (citing McGee v. In-
ternational Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)); "plaintiffs interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief," World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (citing
Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1957)); "the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
354. See Expert Pages v. Buckalew, No. C-97-2109-VRW, 1997 WL 488011
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1997); supra Part II.C.3 and accompanying text.
355. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (suggesting that a court, in
an "appropriate case," may consider other factors). No case since World-Wide
Volkswagen has suggested otherwise.
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minimum contacts, state sovereignty will nonetheless remain
honored. 35 6
Greater focus on the reasonableness test and acceptance of
an Internet contact as constitutionally valid, will satisfy sev-
eral issues. First, it will allay fears that world-wide jurisdiction
will necessarily result. Secondly, it will enable plaintiffs,
harmed by activities conducted through the Internet, access to a
convenient forum. Access to a convenient forum is a considera-
tion which must not be overlooked. 357 It is especially critical in
Internet cases. A defendant who utilizes the Internet to his
benefit should not avoid suit in a foreign forum, especially when
defending a suit in another forum would be a hardship to the
plaintiff.358 This is especially true when the express or implied
purpose of the defendant's web site is to attract attention over
the Internet.
Contrast, for example, the two California decisions, Hall 359
and Expert Pages.360 In both, the courts agreed that Internet
presence is constitutionally sufficient. 361 However, only in the
Hall case did the court conclude that an assertion of personal
jurisdiction would be appropriate. 362 This is due to the fact that
the Expert Pages court adopted, in substance, the approach pro-
posed in this Note.363 Since the defendant in Expert Pages was
a young adult, unable to finance a suit in the distant forum of
California, the court refused to assert personal jurisdiction over
356. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293 (writing that to "remain
faithful to the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution,"
the reasonableness test may prevent asserting personal jurisdiction even after
finding sufficient minimum contacts). The Court also recapitulated the Framers'
intent when they designed the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, not-
ing that a balance must be struck between free trade between states ("in which the
States are debarred from acting as separable economic entities") and state sover-
eignty ("sovereign power to try cases in their courts"). Id.
357. See id. at 292. The Court indicated that "[i]mplicit in this emphasis on
reasonableness ... [is] the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief." Id.
358. See id.
359. See Hall v. LaRonde, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Ct. App. 1997); supra Part
II.C.3 and accompanying text.
360. See Expert Pages v. Buckalew, No. C-97-2109-VRW, 1997 WL 488011
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1997); supra Part II.C.3 and accompanying text.
361. See supra Part II.C.3 and accompanying text.
362. See Hall, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 400.
363. See Expert Pages, 1997 WL 488011, at *3-5.
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him because such an assertion would have been
unreasonable. 364
The approach adopted in Expert Pages should be applied to
Internet cases in order to prevent defendants from being de-
prived of their due process rights when the assertion of personal
jurisdiction would be unreasonable. This approach should have
been applied in Bensusan. The Bensusan court should have rec-
ognized the presence of minimum contacts, consistent with cur-
rent personal jurisdiction law. 365 Next, the court should have
turned to the issue of reasonableness and asserted personal ju-
risdiction, only if doing so would have been reasonable.
In considering Internet jurisdiction, the Jolly Hotels 366
court established a scale to determine whether Internet activi-
ties would qualify as a basis for personal jurisdiction. 367
Although the scale applies to the minimum contacts analysis, 368
it is a model by which courts could assess the reasonableness
factors. In the first category, the defendant engages in Internet
activities which are purposefully directed to the forum state. 369
Traditional analyses apply to assert personal jurisdiction, bar-
ring an extreme burden on the defendant.370
In the second category, the defendant engages in informa-
tion exchanges with the host computer located in the forum.371
Under the minimum contacts analysis, the court in Jolly Hotels
mandates an assessment of the nature and extent of communi-
cations to determine if minimum contacts exist.372 However,
with the understanding that an Internet contact is a sufficient
one, the minimum contacts test is already satisfied. However,
364. See id.
365. See supra Part II.B and accompanying text.
366. See Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D. N.J. 1997); supra Part
II.C.1 and accompanying text.
367. See Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. at 333.
368. While the model suggested that passive sites were insufficient contacts,
see id., the concept of a scale is recommended here.
369. See id. (citation omitted).
370. See Hall v. LaRonde, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 402 (noting that electronic
contacts ought to be included as part of the quantum of contacts with the forum
state); see also Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105
(1987) (demonstrating a situation in which the burden on the defendant and mini-
mal interest for the forum state, far outweighs the nature and quantity of contacts
with the forum state).
371. See Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. at 333 (citation omitted).
372. See id.
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under the reasonableness test approach, the court would con-
sider the nature and quality of the communications with the
host computer in light of such factors as the burden on the de-
fendant and the interest of the forum state.37 3 Since the quality
and quantity of contacts may vary, an inverse relationship
would emerge such that the more tenuous the contacts, the
more "reasonable" the assertion must be.
The third category, where the defendant's web site is pas-
sive and entails only advertising or information, poses the most
difficult scenario since the ties to the forum state arguably are
most tenuous. For the reasons elucidated above, 374 however,
minimum contacts may be found in this situation. Since it in-
volves the least participation of the defendant, however, the
plaintiff would be required to make a strong showing of factors
under the reasonableness test. Under this formulation, a court
will be able to prevent asserting jurisdiction when a defendant
is, for instance, a young adult who uses the Internet as an inex-
pensive advertising tool for a small business with little income.
The same formulation, however, could be used to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction against a company attempting to hide behind
technology and avoid foreign suits.
3. Not Just Semantics
Shifting to a greater emphasis on the reasonableness test
in Internet cases may result in defeating personal jurisdiction
when appropriate. Surely, proponents of the argument that the
Internet does not provide an adequate basis for personal juris-
diction may feel vindicated that, in the end, a passive Internet
site is probably not a valid source upon which to assert personal
jurisdiction. Consequently, is the analysis in this Note just a
question of semantics? Indeed, it is not.
Understanding that a passive Internet site constitutes a
valid contact under the minimum contacts analysis materially
changes the way in which modern personal jurisdiction cases
will be viewed. Certainly in some cases, the result (of refusing
to assert personal jurisdiction) may be the same as it would be if
a web site was not a constitutionally sufficient contact. But, in
373. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980);
supra Part II.B and accompanying text.
374. See Parts IV.A, lV.B and accompanying text.
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cases such as Bensusan and Pres-Kap, and others which will be
presented to courts in the future, where the defendant would
not be challenged with an unreasonable order to defend in a for-
eign forum, an understanding that the Internet constitutes a
valid contact is essential. Foreclosing any possible assertion of
personal jurisdiction predicated on Internet contacts will enable
defendants to rely on the doctrine as both a sword and shield in
conducting foreign business.
V. Conclusion
Internet presence is a constitutionally valid contact for the
purposes of asserting personal jurisdiction. 375 A defendant un-
dertaking to be present on the world-wide web has knowledge
that his publication will be visible anywhere the Internet may
be accessed. After all, inexpensive and expansive publication
seems to be a key purpose of Internet presence. In this way,
therefore, a defendant is free to use the Internet as a tool to
reach into a foreign forum and influence its citizens. This
sword, however, may not also be used as a shield against de-
fending a suit in a foreign forum.
There will be instances, however, when suit in a foreign fo-
rum will be manifestly unfair, especially in light of the quantity
and quality of the defendant's Internet presence. Therefore, to
prevent unfair assertions of personal jurisdiction, shifting to the
second prong of the International Shoe test 376 is in order.
Viewed on a scale, as a defendant's Internet presence becomes
greater, the defendant will be required to make a greater show-
ing of unreasonableness.
375. For arguments against the use of the Internet as a constitutional contact,
see, for example, Corey B. Ackerman, World-Wide Volkswagen, Meet the World-
Wide Web: An Examination of Personal Jurisdiction Applied to a New World, 71
ST. JoH''s L. REV. 403 (1997) (arguing that reliance on the Internet as "presence"
in a forum state dilutes traditional due process requirements); Gwenn M. Kalow,
From the Internet to Court: Exercising Jurisdiction Over World-Wide Web Commu-
nications, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241 (1997) (arguing for the application of Justice
O'Connor's Asahi approach, which leads to the conclusion that an Internet adver-
tising site, will never constitute a minimum contact in the forum state).
376. See supra Part II.B and accompanying text (discussing the "reasonable-
ness test" from International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945)).
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The finding in Bensusan, however, was improper. To deny
that electronic contacts can ever be constitutionally satisfactory
enables defendants to utilize a system of distribution without
being held accountable. It is logically inconsistent to suggest
that established Internet contacts are distinguishable from
other types of contacts previously recognized by courts nation-
wide. The doctrine of personal jurisdiction has evolved from
strict physical presence to a more abstract concept of "pres-
ence." Following the evolution of this doctrine, Internet con-
tacts should be considered constitutionally sufficient and the
necessary protections for defendants should be considered.
Leonard Klingbaum377
377. The author wishes to thank Florina for her unyielding patience and sup-
port, and the members of the Law Review staff for their assistance in making this
piece publishable.
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